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The emergence of large-scale connectivity underlies the proper functioning of many networked sys-
tems, ranging from social networks and technological infrastructure to global trade networks. Per-
colation theory characterizes network formation following stochastic local rules, while optimization
models of network formation assume a single controlling authority or one global objective function.
In socio-economic networks, however, network formation is often driven by individual, locally opti-
mal decisions. How such decisions impact connectivity is only poorly understood to date. Here, we
study how large-scale connectivity emerges from decisions made by rational agents that individually
minimize costs for satisfying their demand. We establish that the solution of the resulting nonlinear
optimization model is exactly given by the final state of a local percolation process. This allows us
to systematically analyze how locally optimal decisions on the micro-level define the structure of
networks on the macroscopic scale.
The proper functioning of networked systems funda-
mentally relies on their established large-scale connec-
tivity. The global connectivity of social, economic and
technological networks, such as the internet, trade and
transportation networks, enables global communication
and exchange, but also the rapid spreading of diseases
[1–7]. The loss of connectivity, or even of a single con-
nection, may cause catastrophic effects such as the col-
lapse of ecological networks, blackouts of power grids and
other infrastructures, or even a global economic crisis [8–
15]. Understanding how global connectivity emerges thus
constitutes a key challenge in the field of network science.
Two major theoretical approaches have been estab-
lished for revealing core properties of the emergence of
large-scale connectivity. First, the theory of percola-
tion provides fundamental insights about network forma-
tion processes by assuming that new links are established
stochastically according to some local rule [16, 17]. For
such percolation models, a variety of distinct structure-
forming phenomena have been observed, where diverse
network topologies emerge even for simple link forma-
tion rules [7, 18–24]. Second, global optimization models
explain network formation controlled by a central author-
ity or driven by a single global objective function. These
models have been studied to construct and understand
aspects of the structure of various man-made or biologi-
cal networks [25–32].
The formation of many socio-economic networks, how-
ever, is driven by local agents making individual decisions
based on optimizing their own goals. Such settings result
in networks constrained by many individual, yet interact-
ing optimization problems. A similar motivation under-
lies game-theoretic models of network formation [33–41].
These models allow a more detailed analysis of the for-
mation process and the stability of the resulting network.
Unsurprisingly, however, they are often hard, if not im-
possible, to solve, especially for larger networks, which
limits mechanistic insights.
In this Letter we study network formation processes
based on rational agents that individually optimize
their own local objective function. Given costs for
production and transaction (including transport) in an
underlying transport network, each agent satisfies its
own demand at minimal costs [42, 43]. We establish an
exact mapping between the solutions of the resulting
nonlinear optimization problems and the states of a local
percolation process. This enables us to systematically
investigate optimal collective network formation and to
reveal discontinuous transitions of the network structure
and hysteresis. These effects are independent of the
network topology or specific choices of the cost functions.
The proposed framework thus bridges (deterministic)
network optimization and stochastic local percolation.
From optimization to percolation — We analyze a net-
work formation model based on the following fundamen-
tal network supply problem. Consider an underlying net-
work of N nodes and M links, describing agents and
potential transportation routes, where each agent must
satisfy its demand. We study the network of trades that
actually evolves between the nodes, similar to bond per-
colation on an underlying network or random graph [16].
Specifically, we assume each node i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is an
agent with a fixed demand Di. The agent satisfies this
demand by purchasing supplies Ski ≥ 0 from any nodes k,
including itself, under the constraint that
∑
k Ski = Di.
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Figure 1. Network Supply Problem. Each agent i sat-
isfies its demand Di by purchasing supplies Ski from nodes k
at minimum costs via the available transport routes (dashed
lines). The costs Ki =
∑
kK
P
ki +K
T
ki for these purchases in-
clude production costs KPki at node k and transaction costs
KTki between the nodes [Eq. (1)]. The production costs depend
on the total production Sk =
∑
i Ski at node k [Eq. (2)]. The
transaction costs are proportional to the effective distance Tki
of the transport route between the nodes [Eq. (3)].
(Throughout the manuscript sums run over all nodes,
here k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, unless otherwise noted.) Each agent
tries to achieve this with minimal cost
Ki =
∑
k
KPki + K
T
ki , (1)
including both production costs KPki at node k as well as
transaction costs KTki between the two nodes (see Fig. 1).
The production costs depend nonlinearly on the pur-
chases Ski
KPki = pk(Sk)Ski (2)
since the costs per unit pk(Sk) typically depend on the
total production Sk =
∑
j Skj at node k. Often, the
production costs per unit are decreasing, dpk/dSk < 0,
accounting for, e.g., increased efficiency with increased
production, commonly referred to as economies of scale.
The transaction costs are proportional to the amount
of transported goods Ski and to the effective distance Tki
between the two nodes,
KTki = pTSkiTki , (3)
where Tki =
∑
e te is given as the sum of the distances te
of all edges e along the (shortest) path between k and i in
the underlying transport network. The factor pT denotes
the transaction costs per unit good and unit distance,
describing effects of fuel costs or delivery times.
All agents solve their individual nonlinear opti-
mization problem [Eq.(1)] simultaneously, defining the
network of optimal purchases Ski. The resulting state
of this network then corresponds to a Nash-equilibrium
[44], where no agent can reduce its cost by changing its
purchases given that all other purchases remain constant.
Results — A simple, yet efficient solution to this prob-
lem can be found for non-increasing production costs per
unit pk. In this case, we find that any agent i chooses a
 
Figure 2. Local percolation induced by optimization.
Every agent chooses a single optimal supplier to satisfy its
demand if the production costs per unit pk(Sk) decrease with
increasing production (economies of scale). When the trans-
action costs per unit pT are large, all agents make only local
purchases from their own node. As pT decreases, the trans-
action costs decrease and agents start to purchase from other
nodes. Some potential transportation routes (dashed lines)
become active trade links (arrows). This trade network grows
along the shortest paths in the network as transaction costs
become smaller. As the transaction costs disappear (pT → 0),
the network will become globally connected. All agents then
share the same supplier, minimizing their production costs.
If the demand of all agents is identical Di ≡ D, the solution
to the supply problem can be found locally and is given by
the final state of a local percolation model.
single supplier i∗, such that Si∗i = Di and Ski = 0 for
k 6= i∗. In general each agent would have to check each
node in the network to find its optimal supplier. Inter-
estingly, if the demand of all agents is identical, Di ≡ D,
this optimal supplier can be found locally : An agent i
just has to query its direct neighbors about their current
suppliers to find its optimal supplier i∗.
Here, we provide a brief intuitive argument: Any pur-
chase of agent i has to be transported via one of its
neighbors j. Since transaction costs are additive over
the transport links and all agents have identical demand,
agent j effectively solves the same optimization problem
as agent i (minus the transaction costs from j to i). When
j finds its optimal supplier, this supplier is also a poten-
tial optimal supplier of agent i when transporting via j.
Thus, agent i simply compares the suppliers of all its
neighbors (all potentially optimal suppliers, one for each
possible path of transport). One of these must then be
the optimal supplier for agent i (see Supplemental Mate-
rial Sec. I and II for a rigorous proof and details of the
simulation [45]).
We investigate this local percolation model starting
with large transaction costs, pT = ∞, and, correspond-
ingly, only internal production i∗ = i and Sii = Di.
As pT decreases, the transaction costs decrease and
agents minimize their total costs by establishing external
purchases Ski from nodes with lower production costs.
Finally, transaction costs disappear at pT = 0 and all
31 2 3 4 500
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(c)(a) (b) Complete graph
0.9 1.1 1.30.70
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Random planar network
Figure 3. From continuous transitions to discontinuous transitions and hysteresis. The type of the transition
to a single globally connected component changes depending on the strength of the economies of scale in the cost function.
(a) Example of a small random network embedded in the unit square. The parameters bi ∈ [0, 1] are given by the real part
of a smooth random function b(x, y) generated from 210 × 210 discrete Fourier modes with mean amplitude 0 and variance
S(ωx, ωy) = (ω
2
x + ω
2
y)
−2 (see also Supplemental Material Sec. III [45]). (b) Single realizations (dashed lines) of the evolution
of the relative size of the largest cluster for a random planar network with N = 104 nodes and average and standard deviation
over 100 random realizations of the bi (solid lines and shading). (c) The predicted behavior for a completely connected network
in the mean field limit N →∞ (see text). Weak economies of scale (a < ac) lead to a continuous growth of the largest cluster.
Sufficiently strong economies of scale (a > ac) lead to a discontinuous transition. Reversing the process, i.e., increasing the
transaction costs, leads to a direct reversal for weak economies of scale, but hysteresis is observed for strong economies of scale.
agents will have the same supplier minimizing their
production costs (Fig. 2). We study the size C(i∗) of
the connected components (clusters) in the network
defined by these purchases, this means the number
of agents {i1, i2, . . . } with the same supplier i∗. As
for standard percolation we record the size C1(pT ) of
the currently largest cluster (and C2 for the second
largest cluster and so on). In the following examples
we consider linearly decreasing production costs per
unit pk(Sk) = bk − aSk, where a ≥ 0 directly quantifies
the strength of the economies of scale. The results are
qualitatively unchanged for all forms of decreasing pk
(see Supplemental Material [45]).
Discontinuous percolation and hysteresis — We illus-
trate the emergence of connectivity in a random spatially
embedded network in Fig. 3(a,b), revealing the impor-
tance of economies of scale. Weak economies of scale
(small a) lead to a continuous growth of the largest clus-
ter. Sufficiently strong economies of scale lead to a dis-
continuous evolution of the size of the largest cluster in
the network. A microscopic decrease of the transaction
costs triggers a cascade of decisions: As the cluster size
increases, the production costs of its supplier decrease
and a large fraction of agents join this connected compo-
nent. In the language of percolation, a giant connected
component emerges in a continuous (weak economies of
scale) or discontinuous (strong economies of scale) phase
transition.
Moreover, multiple stable states exist for sufficiently
strong economies of scale. In an intermediate interval of
transaction costs pT the network settles on one of the
possible structures, depending on the previous state of
the network: hysteresis emerges. Thus, a large cluster
may remain stable after it has emerged for decreasing
pT , even when pT is increased again [Fig. 3(b,c)].
Underlying mechanism — To understand the mecha-
nism underlying these different transitions, we analyze
a mathematically tractable system in detail. We con-
sider a network of all-to-all coupled units with demand
Di = 1/N separated by effective distances te = 1 for all
edges e. We take bi = i/N for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, approxi-
mating the uniform distribution bi ∈ [0, 1] in the limit of
large system size N .
We now track individual decisions by considering the
cost per unit Ki(k) agent i pays for purchases at node k.
Since transaction costs across all links are identical, the
first link to be established will be between the node with
the highest production cost (node N) and the one with
the smallest (node 1). This happens when the cost per
unit KN (1) for agent N to import from node 1 become
smaller than the costKN (N) to buy internally: KN (1) =
1/N − 2a/N + pT < 1− a/N = KN (N), that is for pT <
pNT = 1−1/N+a/N . Similarly, we can calculate when the
next link between agent N − 1 and node 1 is established:
KN−1(1) = 1/N − 3a/N + pT < (N − 1)/N − a/N =
KN−1(N − 1), that is for pT < pN−1T = 1− 2/N + 2a/N .
The other agents follow the same pattern.
Considering the two links, we now have to distin-
guish two cases: if a < ac = 1, then pN−1T < p
N
T
and the agents N and N − 1 will establish their
links sequentially at different values of pT . The
largest cluster will grow continuously with a slope
of (1/N)/(pN−1T − pNT ) = 1/(a − 1). However, if the
economies of scale are stronger (a ≥ ac = 1), the cost at
node 1 decrease sufficiently for the next link to be estab-
lished immediately since pN−1T ≥ pNT . The cluster grows
discontinuously in a single cascade. If the economies of
scale are even stronger (a > ac = 1), the cluster is stable
with respect to single agents changing their supplier for
larger values of pT , causing hysteresis when increasing
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Figure 4. Impact of the network structure on the per-
colation transition. Size and discontinuities of large con-
nected components for an underlying Watts-Strogatz small
world network (N = 104, k = 8, see Supplemental Material
Sec. III and V [45]). (a),(b) Single realizations for the size of
the components C(i∗) of three specific large suppliers. In a
network with large diameter [panel (a), qrew = 10−5] multi-
ple clusters grow simultaneously and merge for small pT . In
a network with small diameter [panel (b), qrew = 10−2] one
large cluster emerges in a single cascade. (c) Maximum size
of the n-th largest cluster as a function of the topological ran-
domness qrew (error bars omitted for visibility). (d) Largest
change of the size of the largest cluster (error bars indicate the
standard deviation). Averages are taken over 100 realizations.
pT . This qualitative behavior is independent of the
network topology in the sense that for sufficiently large
economies of scale the transition will always become
discontinuous (see Supplemetal Material [45]).
Impact of network topology — Besides changes in pro-
duction costs, the growth of the trade network is also
determined by changes in transaction costs, that means
by the underlying physical transportation network. For
the same economies of scale we find different routes of
network formation depending on the structure of the net-
work. If the network diameter (the longest shortest path
between any two nodes) is small, the paths in the network
are short and only one cluster emerges. If the diameter
is large, multiple large clusters appear. This difference is
already evident when comparing the spatially embedded
(large diameter) and complete network (small diameter)
for a = 1 [compare Fig. 3(b) and 3(c)].
To systematically study this effect we fix the economies
of scale a = 1 and consider a network class introduced
by Watts and Strogatz [23]. Starting from a regular ring
network with a large diameter where each node is con-
nected to its k neighbors, each link is randomly rewired
with probability qrew. This introduces shortcuts and re-
duces the diameter of the network. If the diameter is
large [qrew small, Fig. 4 (a)], different suppliers can at-
tract large clusters of agents from their local part of
the network when pT decreases. Fig. 4 (c) illustrates
the maximum size of the n-th largest cluster, showing
that multiple large clusters emerge for qrew ≤ 10−5 (less
than one shortcut per node). Only for small values of
pT do these clusters interact and finally merge in small
cascades to a single giant cluster. If the diameter is small
[qrew large, Fig. 4 (b)], only a single cluster emerges, at-
tracting nodes from all parts of the network. The largest
cluster then grows in a single cascade until it fills the
entire network [Fig. 4 (c),(d)].
To illustrate this effect with a realistic network
topology, we consider an elementary model of a world
transport network (Fig. 5). The nodes of the network
represent individual countries or regions and links
represent transport routes via land between neighboring
countries or shipping routes via sea (for a detailed
description of the model parameters and all data see
Supplemental Material Sec. VII [45]). Similarly to
the small-world network, we explore different network
structures by varying the costs for different modes of
transportation, modifying the effective distances of
transport via land and sea. If transport via sea is
expensive the network has a large diameter, similar to
the random planar network [Fig. 3(a,b)]. Multiple large
clusters appear in different regions of the world, merging
when pT becomes small [Fig. 5 (a)-(d)]. Conversely, if
transport via sea is cheap, the network becomes densely
connected with a small diameter, similar to the complete
graph [Fig. 3(c)], and a single largest cluster grows in a
sudden cascade [Fig. 5 (e)-(g)].
Discussion — Taken together, we have proposed a
class of network formation models that demonstrates how
fundamental aspects of local economic decisions impact
global network formation. In contrast to random link ad-
dition extensively studied before [16, 22, 46], link addi-
tion in this model is driven by individual decisions: each
node minimizes its own costs to satisfy a fixed demand
by establishing a trade network across a given network
of (potential) transport routes. The model class is gen-
eral in the sense that the illustrated phenomena are in-
dependent of both the details of the network topology
as well as of the details of the cost functions. Specifi-
cally, whereas we have analyzed the model with linearly
decreasing production costs per unit, linearity is not re-
quired. Any decreasing cost function yields qualitatively
the same results (see Supplemental Material [45]).
In an analytically solvable limit we showed that the
solution of the resulting interacting optimization prob-
lems exactly maps to the final state of a local percola-
tion process, thereby enabling a systematic analysis of
the transition from localized trading to a macroscopi-
cally connected trade network. Importantly, the network
evolution exhibits hysteresis, that means decreasing an
external factor (e.g. the transaction cost per unit) may
induce global interactions but increasing the same factor
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Figure 5. Preferred modes of transport change network evolution. Global connectivity induced by locally optimal
decisions in a model of a world transport network (see Supplemental Material Sec. VII for details [45]). (a) Evolution of the
size C(i∗) of specific clusters identified by a supplier i∗ when transport via sea is more expensive than transport via land (by a
factor TS = 5). Due to the high costs of sea transport, the network diameter is large and multiple large clusters can emerge in
different parts of the world. (b)-(d) Network structure and active trade links for different values of the transactions costs pT .
Land routes are preferred to transport via sea. (e) Evolution of the size of the emerging cluster for small sea transport costs
(TS = 0.2). Due to sea routes connecting most countries cheaply, the network diameter is small and only one large component
emerges in a single large cascade. This transition happens for larger pT as the overall diameter of the network is much smaller.
(f),(g) The state of the network immediately before and after the transition.
does not directly reverse this system-scale impact.
These results directly link deterministic, optimization-
based approaches of network formation [26–30, 32–
35, 38–41] and prototypical percolation processes
[7, 18–24] based on purely random link addition.
Specifically, the model illustrates the connection of
(discontinuous) percolation to geographically distributed
trade networks [42, 43]. More generally, our framework
shows how economic factors and the actual connectivity
may shape the structure of socio-economic networks
through individual locally optimal decisions.
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accompanying the manuscript
Hysteretic percolation from locally optimal individual decisions
Malte Schröder, Jan Nagler, Marc Timme and Dirk Witthaut
In the main manuscript we introduced a network formation model where link addition is based on individual
decisions of local agents in a fundamental network supply problem. In general the resulting individual optimization
problems are too complex to be solved efficiently for large systems. We discussed how these optimization problems
map to a local percolation model with an efficient solution, bridging the gap between global optimization models
of network formation and stochastic local percolation models. This mapping allowed us to efficiently study the
phenomena emerging in this network formation model.
In this supplemental material we give the rigorous proofs for the mapping as well as additional details and examples
for the model. First, we consider the mapping of the optimization problem to a percolation model. In particular, we
discuss in detail the assumptions and requirements on the cost functions and other parameters for this mapping to be
valid and give a rigorous proof. We also describe the simulation procedure resulting from these conditions. Second,
we discuss in more detail the parameter choices made for the examples shown in the main manuscript in relation
to properties of the model, describing how and why we take the limit of an increasing number of nodes N → ∞ as
a fine-graining rather than an expansion of the system in relation to the underlying network topology (for example
random and small world networks). Third, we provide an additional example for an analytically solvable system in a
continuous interpretation of the model, linking the equilibrium states and transitions to bifurcations of stable states
of a corresponding self-consistency equation. Finally, we include a detailed description of the data used for the world
transport network simulations in the main manuscript and a brief comparison of the exact solution for the world trans-
port network to the approximate solution with our local percolation algorithm, which is shown in the main manuscript.
THE NETWORK SUPPLY PROBLEM
To begin, we reiterate the basic idea of the network formation model as defined in the main manuscript: Starting
with an underlying network of N nodes andM potential transport links, we consider each node i to be an agent with a
fixed demand Di that it satisfies by purchases Ski from nodes k, possibly internally from k = i. These purchases incur
a cost of two parts: First, the production cost KPki = Skipk(Sk) at node k depending on the total amount of production
Sk at that node. Second, a transaction cost (e.g., transport cost) in the underlying network, KTki = pTSkiTki, where
Tki =
∑
e∈Π(k,i) te is the sum over the transaction costs of all links e along the shortest (cheapest) path Π(k, i) from k
to i. The parameter pT describes the transaction costs per unit across the network, i.e., the importance of transaction
costs relative to production costs. We assume that each agent only decides its purchases and the production at a node
is always given as the sum of all purchases made from that node, Sk =
∑
i Ski. As in the main manuscript, sums run
over all nodes i ∈ {1, . . . , N} unless noted otherwise. Similarly, each agent always satisfies its demand exactly, such
that Di =
∑
k Ski. Each agent i then individually optimizes its purchases Ski to minimize its cost Ki while satisfying
its demand:
minimize Ki =
∑
k
Skipk(Sk) + pT
∑
k
Ski ∑
e∈Π(k,i)
te
 (4)
subject to
∑
k
Ski = Di
Ski ≥ 0 ∀ k .
We consider the evolution of the network of trades described by the purchases Ski when the transaction cost pT
decrease, starting from pT = ∞ with initially only internal production Sii = Di and Ski = 0 for i 6= k. Large
transaction costs per unit pT mean that no external purchases are made across the network. As pT decreases,
some agents start buying at cheaper neighbors and small, localized connected components (clusters) start to grow.
9Specifically, as in standard percolation theory, we are interested in the evolution of the size of the largest cluster
C1(pT ).
To allow easier readability, we use different indices to denote nodes or agents based on their role in the current
context wherever possible. We summarize the variables together with their meaning in the following table:
N The number of nodes in the system, system size
eij Link (potential transport link) between nodes i and j
te, tij Distance for the link e from node i to j
Π(k, i) Shortest (cheapest) path from k to i, Π(k, i) = {ekj1 , ej1j2 , . . . , ejni}
Tki Total distance between the nodes k and i, Tki =
∑
e∈Π(k,i) te
pT Transaction cost per unit good and distance, relative importance of transaction cost
i, j Index of an agent (currently looking to make purchases)
k, l Index of a node (currently considered as a supplier)
i′, j′ Index of the current supplier of agent i, j
i∗, j∗ Index of the/an optimal supplier of agent i, j
Di The (fixed) demand of agent i
Sk The current, total production of node k
Sik The production of node k disregarding possible purchases by agent i, S
i
k = Sk − Ski
Ski The amount agent i purchases from node k
pk (Sk) The production cost per unit at node k with a total production Sk
Ki The total cost, including transaction costs and production costs, of all purchases of agent i
Ki(k) The total cost of agent i when only purchasing from node k
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MAPPING TO A LOCAL PERCOLATION MODEL
In general the optimization problem described above is very complex and quickly grows intractable for larger
systems. Here we derive a general updating scheme in terms of a local percolation model, showing that it exactly
solves all individual optimization problems under certain conditions. We first consider the cost function of a single
agent i
Ki =
∑
k
[
Skipk
(
Sik + Ski
)
+ pTSkiTki
]
, (5)
where Sik =
∑
j 6=i Skj denotes the production of node k ignoring purchases by agent i, such that Sk = S
i
k + Ski, and
we write the total distance over all links from k to i as Tki. The problem becomes considerably easier for the family of
cost functions describing so called economies of scale, this means decreasing production costs per unit with increasing
production. In this case the problem of finding the optimal Ski reduces to finding a single optimal supplier.
Lemma 1. Given an individual minimization problem of agent i defined by Eq. (4) with non-increasing production
costs per unit at each node, ∂pk∂Sk (Sk) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, there is a node i∗ such that Ki is minimal with
Si∗i = Di and Ski = 0 for k 6= i∗.
Proof. Choose the node l for which
peffl (S
i
l + Di) = pl(S
i
l + Di) + pTTli (6)
is smallest. Together with ∂pk/∂Sk ≤ 0 for all nodes k we then obtain
peffl (S
i
l + Di) ≤ peffk (Sik + Di) ≤ peffk (Sik + Ski) (7)
for all nodes k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and arbitrary purchases 0 ≤ Ski ≤ Di. Using the constraint that Di =
∑
k Ski this
implies
Ki(S1i = 0, S2i = 0, . . . , Sli = Di, Sl+1,i = 0, . . .)
= Dip
eff
l (S
i
l + Di)
≤
∑
k
Skip
eff
k (S
i
k + Ski)
= Ki(S1i, S2i, S3i, . . .) (8)
for all possible purchases (S1i, S2i, S3i, . . .). Thus the costs Ki assume a global minimum if agent i satisfies its entire
demand by purchases from a single node i∗ = l, this means for
Si∗i = Di and Ski = 0 for k 6= i∗ .
In particular this class of non-decreasing functions includes the affine-linear production costs per uni
pk (Sk) = bk − a · Sk with a ≥ 0 used in the main manuscript. However, we are not restricted to identical
slopes or even functions of the same form for different nodes. We therefore cover a broad range of cases where the
cost functions of all nodes are non-increasing in the range of possible production Sk ∈ [0,
∑
iDi].
With the above simplification, we now consider the optimization problem of agent i of finding the best i∗ to minimize
Ki (i
∗) = Dipi∗
(
Sii∗ + Di
)
+ pTDi
∑
e∈Π(i∗,i)
te . (9)
To find an equilibrium, we can in principle simply try all possible alternatives, as formulated in the following algorithm.
However, such a brute-force approach can become quickly infeasible for large networks such that we will consider
further simplifications in the following sections.
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Definition 1 (Equilibrium). Consider the optimization problem defined above [Eq. (4)] with non-increasing production
costs per unit pk(Sk) for all agents k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. An agent i is in equilibrium at its current supplier i′, if and
only if there is no node k such that Ki(k) < Ki(i′). This means the agent cannot change its supplier to reduce its
costs, given that all other agents keep their current supplier.
We say that the network is in equilibrium if all agents in the network are in equilibrium.
Note that this corresponds to the notion of a Nash-equilibrium, where no agent can decrease its cost by changing
only its own supplier. Note also, while the network might be in equilibrium, this does not necessarily mean that the
total cost for all agents,
∑
iKi, is minimal.
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General algorithm
Consider the optimization problem defined above with non-increasing production costs per unit pk(Sk) for all agents
k = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Given a fixed value pT , for each agent i, individually,
find i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , N}
minimizing Ki (i
∗) = Dipi∗
(
Sii∗ + Di
)
+ pTDi
∑
e∈Π(i∗,i)
te . (10)
In general, the following algorithm yields an equilibrium (though not necessarily the global optimum) when it termi-
nates:
Algorithm 1 General optimization
1: repeat
2: U ← ∅
3: for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} do
4: for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} do
5: Calculate Ki(k) [where Ski = Di and Sli = 0 for all l 6= k].
6: if Ki(k) < Ki(i′) where currently Si′i = Di then
7: U ← U ∪ {Ki(k)}
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: if U 6= ∅ then
12: Calculate {i, i∗} such that Ki(i∗) = minU Ki(k)
13: Si∗i ← Di
14: Si′i ← 0
15: end if
16: until U = ∅
In words, for every step we calculate the cost for all agents and possible suppliers. If an agent i would prefer a
new supplier k to its current supplier i′ we add the corresponding cost to the list of possible updates U . Here, we use
Ki(k) to denote both the final cost for agent i as well as the corresponding update itself. In the end we execute the
update with the smallest final cost (clearly any update will find the currently optimal choice i∗ for agent i, since we
check all possible suppliers in the network). We repeat this process until no further update is possible.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 will always terminate in finite time. When it terminates the network will be in an equilibrium
state, where no agent can reduce its costs by changing its supplier.
Proof. Firstly, the algorithm only terminates when there are no possible updates, i.e., when no single agent can further
reduce its costs by changing its supplier. As we assumed non-increasing production costs per unit, a single supplier
is always an optimal solution. Thus no single agent i can reduce its costs at all and we always end in an equilibrium.
Conversely, if the network is in equilibrium, no agent can reduce its cost. The update list will be empty and the
algorithm will terminate.
Secondly, consider the possibility of the algorithm not terminating at all. This can only happen if the algorithm
runs into a loop, executing the same updates repeating a finite set of states of the network. We now show that such
a loop is impossible:
Assume an initial state I of the network, defined by the pairs of agents and current suppliers I = {(i, i′) , . . . }. A
loop can only occur if the network now reaches a state I − 1, where a single agent i has a different supplier k, but
would like to return to the supplier i′ it has in state I (Ki(i′) < Ki(k)).
To reach this state we need a chain of updates including, at least, one update ua where agent i switches supplier
to k. However, if the reverse update u−1a is strictly beneficial in state I − 1, clearly ua is not beneficial in state I.
Thus the chain needs to consist of more than a single update.
Given that one update alone is not possible, we need another update to enable it. We thus have to consider a chain
of updates ub ◦ ua ◦ u−1b , where ub enables ua and is reversed in the end to arrive at state I − 1. The main idea is
illustrated in Fig. S1. There are only two possible ways how a beneficial update ub can enable ua:
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(1) either an agent j switches from its supplier j′ to the the new supplier k. But then the update ua decreases the
cost Kj(k) further. The reverse update u−1b would then never be executed since Kj(k) < Kj(j
′).
(2) ub could have an agent j switch away from the current supplier j′ = i′ to a different node l. But then ua
further increases the cost Kk(i′) and we again find Kj(l) < Kj(i′), making the reverse update impossible.
Following this line of argument, we need another update uc to enable the update u−1b , e.g., a chain of updates
ub ◦ ua ◦ uc ◦ u−1b ◦ u−1c . This clearly requires a partial ordering of the updates, such that ub, uc, u−1b and u−1c are
executed in this order (otherwise the update uc will have no effect on the update u−1b ). However, by the same logic
as above u−1b would change the cost unfavorably for u
−1
c . We then find the same problem that u−1c would never be
executed at the end of the chain. Repeating the argument, we find the same problem for every finite chain of updates.
Thus, we cannot construct a finite chain of updates to reach I−1. Consequently, we cannot repeat a state and thus
would visit every possible state, but then the algorithm would terminate in (one of) the equilibrium states. Together,
we find that the algorithm must terminate in finite time.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure S1. Illustration of the main argument. Starting from an initial state I, we cannot find a chain of updates that leaves
us in a state I − 1 where agent i buys from k but wants to switch back to i′. (a) Clearly, a single update is not enough, as i
would not want to switch to k. (b) Using another agent j to enable the switch of i to k leaves j buying at k, the reverse update
required to reach state I − 1 is not possible. (c) Following the same logic, a chain with three (or more) updates will also not
be able to reach state I − 1 (see text).
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When local information is sufficient
With the above simplification of non-increasing production costs per unit, we still consider the individual optimiza-
tion problem of node i of finding the best i∗ to minimize
Ki(i
∗) = Dipi∗(Sii∗ + Di) + pTDi
∑
e∈Π(i∗,i)
te . (11)
In principal, we consider every node in the network as a possible supplier. We now show that in certain cases we can
further simplify this optimization by only considering the local neighborhood of agent i to find its best supplier i∗.
Lemma 3. Given the optimization problem defined above with non-increasing production costs per unit pk(Sk) and
homogeneous demand Di = D for all agents i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. If all other agents are in equilibrium, then either i is its
own optimal supplier or there exists a neighbor j of i such that the optimal supplier j∗ of j is also an optimal supplier
of i.
Proof. Obviously, if i∗ = i, we are done.
Otherwise, consider the external optimal supplier i∗ of i. The path from i∗ to i will pass through a neighbor j of
i, such that
Π(i∗, i) = (ei∗k1 , ek1k2 , . . . , ej,i) (12)
Ti∗,i = ti∗k1 + tk1k2 + . . . + tji . (13)
We give a proof by contradiction, assuming that j∗ is not an optimal supplier of i, i.e., j∗ 6= i∗ and Ki(j∗) > Ki(i∗).
Using the fact that j∗ is the optimal supplier of j we obtain the inequality
Kj(j
∗)
D
= pj∗
(
Sjj∗ + D
)
+ pT
∑
e∈Π(j∗,j)
te (14)
≤ pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pT
∑
e∈Π(i∗,j)
te =
Kj(i
∗)
D
. (15)
Since j is in equilibrium we have
Sjj∗ + D = Sj∗
Sji∗ + D = Si∗ + D , (16)
and for agent i we have also
Sj∗ ≤ Sij∗ + D ≤ Sj∗ + D
Si∗ ≤ Sii∗ + D ≤ Si∗ + D , (17)
where Sjj∗ again denotes the production of j
∗ ignoring purchases of agent j and the second set of inequalities simply
states that i may currently be buying from any node, possibly even i∗ or j∗. Using these observations together with
the fact that all pk are non-increasing we find
−pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pi∗
(
Sji∗ + D
)
− pj∗
(
Sjj∗ + D
)
+ pj∗
(
Sij∗ + D
)
= −pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pi∗ (Si∗ + D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
−pj∗ (Sj∗) + pj∗
(
Sij∗ + D
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ 0 . (18)
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We can combine the above inequalities to obtain
Ki(j
∗)
D
= pj∗
(
Sij∗ + D
)
+ pT
∑
e∈Π(j∗,i)
te
≤ pj∗
(
Sij∗ + D
)
+ pT
∑
e∈Π(j∗,j)
te + pT tji
= pj∗
(
Sjj∗ + D
)
+ pT
∑
e∈Π(j∗,j)
te − pj∗
(
Sjj∗ + D
)
+ pj∗
(
Sij∗ + D
)
+ pT tji
≤ pi∗
(
Sji∗ + D
)
+ pT
∑
e∈Π(i∗,j)
te − pj∗
(
Sjj∗ + D
)
+ pj∗
(
Sij∗ + D
)
+ pT tji
= pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pT
∑
e∈Π(i∗,j)
te + pT tji
− pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pi∗
(
Sji∗ + D
)
− pj∗
(
Sjj∗ + D
)
+ pj∗
(
Sij∗ + D
)
≤ pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pT
∑
e∈Π(i∗,i)
te
=
Ki(i
∗)
D
, (19)
where the first inequality is due to j∗ being an optimal supplier for j and the second inequality follows from Eq. (18).
Hence, we know that
Ki(j
∗) ≤ Ki(i∗), (20)
contradicting our original assumption. Therefore j∗ has to be an optimal supplier of i which concludes the proof.
We note that this optimal supplier i∗ = j∗ does not necessarily have to be unique, it is possible that there are
multiple optimal suppliers with identical (minimal) costs.
We briefly summarize the results so far: if we have non-increasing production costs per unit and sufficiently
homogeneous demand [Eq. (18)], we can in principle solve the optimization problem of a single agent i by considering
only its local, direct neighborhood. In particular, this condition is fulfilled under the stronger assumption of identical
demand Di = Dj = D for all agents. However, we assumed a network in (almost) equilibrium, specifically we
assumed that j is already buying at j∗. If this is not the case, it remains to be shown that we can order simultane-
ous updates in such a way that we perform only local updates and still always find the optimal supplier for each agent.
Corollary 3.1. We call the set {i1, i2, . . . } of agents with i∗ as their optimal (and current) supplier the cluster C (i∗)
of i∗. In a network in equilibrium the individual clusters are connected: for every node i ∈ C (i∗) there is a shortest
(cheapest) path Π(i∗, i) = (i∗, j1, j2, . . . , jn, i) from i∗ to i such that all nodes j1, j2 . . . jn ∈ C (i∗). The active links in
the clusters follow the shortest path tree from the supplier.
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Local percolation algorithm
Above we showed that we can always find an optimal supplier for an agent i, given the other agents are in equilibrium,
by considering its neighbors when we have non-increasing production costs per unit and homogeneous demand Di = D
for all agents i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We use this result to derive a simplified, local percolation algorithm to solve this
optimization problem in an efficient way. Since individual purchase decisions can lead to larger changes in the
network, we still need to consider updates in a network out of equilibrium. Here, one can easily construct examples
where there exists an agent that cannot find its (currently) optimal supplier locally. In these cases, however, other
agents will also want to update their purchases and at least one agent can find its optimal supplier locally. Below, we
introduce the algorithm and the ordering of the local updates such that we always update agents who can find their
optimal supplier locally. We show that this defines a local percolation rule taking the network from any state into an
equilibrium with only local updates to find optimal suppliers.
Algorithm 2 Local percolation algorithm
1: repeat
2: U ← ∅.
3: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} do
4: for all j ∈ Neighborhood(i) do
5: Calculate Ki(j′) and Ki(i′), where currently, Si′i = Di and Sj′j = Dj
6: if Ki(j′) < Ki(i′) where currently Si′i = Di then
7: U ← U ∪ {Ki(j′)}
8: end if
9: end for
10: Calculate Ki(i)
11: if Ki(i) < Ki(i′) then
12: U ← U ∪ {Ki(i)}
13: end if
14: end for
15: if U 6= ∅ then
16: Calculate {i, i∗} such that Ki(i∗) = minU Ki(k)
17: Si∗i ← Di
18: Si′i ← 0
19: end if
20: until U = ∅
This algorithm is a local version of the general algorithm, where we check for every agent i only the suppliers j′ of
its neighbors j and itself as possible new suppliers. As before we then execute the update with the smallest final cost
and repeat the process until no further update is possible.
Theorem 4. Consider the optimization problem defined above with non-increasing production cost per unit pk(Sk)
and homogeneous demand Di = D for all agents i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Algorithm 2 only executes updates finding the optimal
supplier for an agent and terminates in finite time in an equilibrium state, where no agent can reduce its costs further.
We now proof this theorem with two supporting Lemmas:
Lemma 5. Given algorithm 2, for every Ki(k) ∈ U , either k = i∗ or there is Kj(l) ∈ U with Kj(l) < Ki(k).
Proof. If k = i∗ we are done.
Otherwise, assuming that k 6= i∗, then also i′ 6= i∗ since Ki(i∗) < Ki(k) < Ki(i′), thus i is not already buying at
i∗. Then, following the path Π(i∗, i) backwards from i to i∗, we will find an agent j (possibly j = i∗ or j = i), where
a local update Kj(i∗) is possible and the current supplier j′ 6= i∗.
We now consider this update Kj(i∗). First we show that this update is in the update list by contradiction. Assume
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Kj(j
′) ≤ Kj(i∗), then similar to the above proof we find
Ki(j
′)
D
= pj′
(
Sij′ + D
)
+ pTTj′i
≤ pj′
(
Sij′ + D
)
+ pTTj′j + pTTji
≤ pj′ (Sj′) + pTTj′j + pTTji
= Kj(j
′) + pTTji
≤ Kj(i∗) + pTTji
≤ pi∗ (Si∗ + D) + pTTi∗j + pTTji
=
Ki(i
∗)
D
, (21)
leading to the contradiction Ki(j′) < Ki(i∗) (i∗ is not the optimal supplier). Otherwise we have Ki(j′) = Ki(i∗) and
we can simple repeat the above argument with i∗ ← j′ (at most until we reach j = i). This shows that there is an
update Kj(i∗) on the list U for some optimal supplier i∗ of i and an agent j on the path Π(i∗, i).
Finally, we find
Kj(i
∗)
D
= pi∗
(
Sji∗ + D
)
+ pTTi∗j
≤ pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pTTi∗j + pTTji
= pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pTTi∗i
= pi∗
(
Sii∗ + D
)
+ pTTi∗i
=
Ki(i
∗)
D
, (22)
since Sji∗ = S
i
i∗ = Si∗ since none of the two agents are buying at i∗. This means that the update Kj(i∗) with
Kj(i
∗) ≤ Ki(i∗) < Ki(k) is in the update list before Ki(k), which concludes the proof.
It then follows directly that:
Corollary 5.1. The update on the list Ki(k) = minU Kj(l) is optimal with k = i∗.
Lemma 6. The network is in an equilibrium, if and only if U = ∅.
Proof. We proof this by showing that the network is not in equilibrium, if and only if U 6= ∅.
Clearly, if there is a possible update on the list, the network is not in equilibrium.
Otherwise, if the network is not in equilibrium there is an agent i currently buying from i′ 6= i∗ which is not its
optimal supplier. We then have Ki(i∗) < Ki(i′). If there was no update on the list, then also the update Ki(i∗) via
i’s neighbor j is not on the list. However, this can only be because j is buying from j′ 6= i∗. But then either
(1) the node j′ would also be an optimal supplier for i (following the same chain of inequalities as above) and the
update Ki(j′) would be on the list
(2) or j would also want to update to buy at i∗.
In the second case we simply repeat the argument above with i ← j (at most until i ← i∗ itself) until we find a
possible update which must be on the list. This shows that there is always an update on the list when the network
is not in equilibrium and thus concludes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 3. By means of Corollary 4.1 we know that the update executed is always an optimum one. Hence
every iteration of the algorithm will find the optimal supplier for an agent. Lemma 5 shows that, when the algorithm
terminates as soon as U is empty, the network is in equilibrium. The proof that the algorithm always terminates in
finite time is identical to the one given above for Algorithm 1. Together these two results proof theorem 3.
In contrast to O(N2) updates that are checked in the general algorithm, we further reduce the number of
possibilities to O(M) local updates, where M is the number of links in the network. In sparse networks, where
O(M) = O(N), networks this significantly reduces the required operations of the algorithm.
Together, we have now shown that for non-increasing production costs per unit pk(Sk) and identical demand of all
agents Di = Dj = D, we can exactly map the interacting individual optimization problems to a local percolation
model when ordering simultaneous updates by their new final cost. These updates will always lead to an equilibrium
state where no agent wants to change suppliers and agents never make sub-optimal updates. Note, however, that due
to the individual optimization the resulting equilibrium is, in general, not the globally optimal state with minimal
total cost
∑
iKi over all agents.
Here, we always use the algorithm in the following way: We start in an equilibrium state, usually the trivial
equilibrium i∗ = i for all i at pT = ∞. Then we consider a decrease (or increase) of pT and calculate the next value
pjiT for which a agent would change its supplier (i.e., when U 6= ∅). We then execute the update and iterate until
no further updates occur at the current value of pT . As we have shown that the algorithm always makes correct
updates, it is also possible to study other initial conditions, reactions to changes in the network structure or sudden
large changes of pT .
Finally, in the last part of this section we briefly give small examples illustrating some assumptions in the proofs
above, such as homogeneous demand, before describing the actual implementation in the next section.
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Examples
In order to illustrate the model, the proofs given above and especially the assumptions going into the proofs, we
give two examples of simple systems. For all examples we will use the same cost per unit functions as in the main
manuscript pk (Sk) = bk − a · Sk with a = 1.
1
D 1 0.1 0.1b 1 0
t12 = 0.1 t23 = 0.42 3
S 2 0 1
1 -0.1 -0.62 0 0.23 0.3 -0.1
1 2 3i\k
1 2 3i
Figure S2. Example for non-homogeneous demand at pT = 1. The tables describe the model parameters and the costs if agent
i would buy (is buying) at node k. Current suppliers are marked in green, if they are optimal, otherwise they are marked
in blue. Optimal decisions are marked in yellow or red, depending on whether they can/cannot be found by a local update,
respectively. Here, agent 1 could buy optimally from node 3 but cannot find out about it via a local update (marked in red),
since agent 2 is buying from 1. Conversely, agent 2 and 3 are already buying optimally at node 1 and 3, respectively (marked
in green). Therefore the only possible update is 1 buying from 3 but it cannot be found with a local update. This illustrates
the requirement of homogeneous demand for the local percolation algorithm.
D 1 1 1b 0 1S 2 0 2
1 -2 -22 -2 -23 -3 -1
1 2 3i\k
1 2 3i
1 1-0.10 1
4 5
-2.1-2.1-2.1
4 5
4 -3 -15 -3 -2 -2.1-1.1
1 2 4 5
3
Figure S3. Example for homogeneous demand at pT = 0 and the importance of update order. The tables describe the model
parameters and the costs if agent i would buy (is buying) at node k. Current suppliers are marked in green, if they are optimal,
otherwise they are marked in blue. Optimal decisions are marked in yellow or red, depending on whether they can/cannot be
found by a local update, respectively. Here, all agents want to update their current purchases (marked in blue), but only agent
4 can find its optimal supplier locally through its neighbor (marked in yellow). Of all possible (local) updates, this update
has the smallest Ki(k) and would be executed first, allowing other agents to follow and find their optimal supplier locally. As
shown above, with homogeneous demand if the network is not in equilibrium we will always find an optimal local update by
sorting for the smallest Ki(k).
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SIMULATION
With the algorithm introduced above we can solve the the individual optimization problems with only local
updates for a given value of pT when the production costs per unit are non-increasing and the demand of all agents
is identical. We now discuss how we exactly track the evolution of the system for the whole range of decreasing
transaction costs pT (increasing transaction costs are handled analogously). First, we note that it is not necessary to
calculate the distances Tki for all shortest (cheapest) paths, since these paths will be found automatically during the
optimization.
We track for each agent i its current supplier i′ and the distance Ti′i, starting from the trivial initial condition
i′ = i for all agents at pT = ∞ (Tii = 0). For all (directed) links we then explicitly calculate the values pjiT where
the link would be active, i.e., when i starts buying via j from j′, where j′ is the supplier of i’s neighbor j. As in the
algorithm above, we also explicitly consider returning to internal production as a special case. Comparing the cost of
the current supplier i′ and the new supplier j′:
Ki(i
′) = D · pi′
[
Sii′ + D
]
+ D · pT · Ti′i, (23)
Ki(j
′ via j) = D · pj′
[
Sij′ + D
]
+ D · pT · (Tj′j + tji) , (24)
we find that i would prefer to buy from j′ when
Ki(j
′ via j) < Ki(i′)
pT · (tji + Tj′j − Ti′i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆T
< pi′
[
Sii′ + D
]− pj′ [Sij′ + D]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆p
. (25)
With this inequality we can easily calculate pjiT . We create the sorted list U =
{(
pjiT ,Ki(j
′), eji
)
, . . .
}
, ordering all
links in descending order in pjiT . If multiple links have the same p
ji
T , e.g., for simultaneous updates during cascades,
we use the new final costs Ki(j′) as a secondary criterion for ordering the updates (increasing in Ki(j′)), as discussed
above. We then have to distinguish three different cases to determine pjiT :
• ∆T > 0
in this case we simply have the condition pT < ∆p∆T . We thus set p
ji
T =
∆p
∆T if the condition is not yet fulfilled
and pjiT = pT otherwise. To calculate Ki(j
′) for the secondary ordering we use the transaction costs pjiT , as this
is the value when the ordering will be relevant. If no other changes occur and this link is not updated again,
this secondary ordering is then already accurate when pT decreases far enough (and will be updated in between
otherwise).
• ∆T = 0
in this case the switch does not depend on the transaction costs at all but the condition is ∆p > 0. If this
condition is fulfilled, we set pjiT = pT , such that the switch will be applied immediately. As above, the secondary
ordering is given by the final cost. Otherwise we set pjiT = −1 and the switch is never executed.
• ∆T < 0
in this case the condition becomes pT > − ∆p|∆T | (note the change in the sign of the inequality). In case the
condition is true, the change is applied instantly and we set pjiT = pT , otherwise we set p
ji
T = −1. This case will
mostly be relevant when considering increasing transaction cost.
We then use this list U to iteratively execute single updates. The link with the largest pjiT (and smallest final
total cost Ki(j′), if applicable) will become active first, meaning i will start buying via j from j’s supplier j′. The
algorithm then follows an event-based methodology:
Starting from pT =∞ and only internal production i∗ = i for all nodes i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we first decrease the value
of pT to the value of the next update pT ← maxU pjit . Then we update i′ ← j′ and Ti′i ← Tj′j + tji. We also adjust
the production of the involved suppliers i′ and j′ accordingly. Due to the economies of scale in the production costs
per unit these changes will affect the values pklT of all links adjacent to agents currently buying from i
′ or j′, for which
we recalculate pklT .
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We then repeat the updating process working through all links with pjiT = pT and keep updating the purchases
until no further changes occur and the next entry in the update list occurs for pjiT < pT . Finally, we repeat this whole
process by further decreasing pT . In contrast to the algorithm for a single update step given above, we will never
have U = ∅. Instead, we terminate once all pjiT ≤ 0 and the transaction cost per unit cannot be reduced further.
The final state of the network will then be given at pT = 0, where generally all agents have the same supplier and
form one large cluster. Note that this updating scheme models a very slow decrease of the transaction costs. In
principle it is also possible to include sudden jumps in pT . Due to the individual optimization, this generally leads
to a different evolution of the clusters (see Sec. VI for examples).
We then reverse the process and consider increasing transaction cost in the same way by adjusting the conditions
for pjiT and reversing the ordering (executing updates with the smallest p
ji
T first). In this case we terminate when
pjiT = ∞ for all possible updates. Overall, this allows us to exactly track the evolution of all clusters in the network
for both increasing as well as decreasing transaction costs per unit.
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NETWORK MODELS
Spatially embedded random networks
We create a spatially embedded planar random network with N nodes by distributing N points uniformly at
random in the unit square. The links of the network are then created using the Delaunay-triangulation of these points
[Fig. (a)]. Each link e is assigned a distance te equal to the euclidean distance between its two endpoints. We further
assume an identical demand Di = 1/N for all nodes.
In order to reasonably study different system sizes (see also Sec. IV for a detailed discussion) we define the parameters
bi of the cost functions as values of a smooth random function on the unit square. The function is generated as the real
part of a random periodic function calculated by spectral synthesis of (210)2 Fourier-modes for frequency components
ωx, ωy ∈
{
0, 1, . . . , 210− 1}. For each Fourier mode we choose a Gaussian distributed amplitude with mean 0 and
variance
(
ω2x + ω
2
y
)−2 and random phase [47]. Inverse Fourier transformation then gives the function b(x, y) at discrete
points which we then interpolate at the positions of the nodes. Finally we shift and scale the values such that bi ∈ [0, 1]
with mini(bi) = 0 and maxi(bi) = 1.
While this technically allows negative production costs per unit when including the economies of scale, a constant
shift bk → bk + const. for all nodes k ∈ {1, . . . , N} does not change the solution of the minimization problem.
Therefore, for simplicity we only consider normalized bk ∈ [0, 1] in all examples.
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Figure S4. Spatially embedded planar random network. (a) A single realization of a network with N = 100 nodes together with
the smooth function b(x, y) determining the parameters bi. (b-d) Evolution of the model for different values of the economies
of scale a. The evolution is similar in for all system sizes and the limit of large networks N → ∞ is well defined due to the
identical scaling of distances and cost differences |bi − bj | since b(x, y) is a smooth function.
Small world networks
To illustrate the effects of the underlying network topology we consider Watts-Strogatz small-world networks [23].
This model allows generating networks that interpolate between regular and random topologies with a large or small
network diameter, respectively: Start from a ring of N nodes where each node is connected to its k/2 nearest neighbors
on each side. Each link in the network is then rewired with probability qrew, i.e., disconnected on one end and connected
to another node in the network, chosen uniformly at random. This procedure interpolates between regular networks
with a large diameter for qrew → 0 and completely random networks with a small diameter for qrew → 1.
For the parameters of our model we assume identical transaction costs for all links te = 1/N as well as identical
demand Di = 1/N for all nodes. The cost function parameters are taken as a = 1 and uniformly randomly chosen
bi ∈ [0, 1] (see also Sec. V).
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EXPANSION VS. FINE-GRAINING
Usually, in percolation models the thermodynamic limit of large systems N → ∞ is relevant for studying the
(phase-)transition to global connectedness. We will now motivate our choice to consider an increased system size N
as a fine-graining of the system.
Apart from the obvious inconsistencies with the models motivation arising for infinitely expanding systems, e.g., an
infinite system size would also mean infinite demand, other problems arise due to the interplay between economies of
scale, initial production costs per unit, and transaction costs. To illustrate this, we assume finite, bounded intervals
for all parameters. Specifically we take the production costs per unit to be pk(S) = bk − aS(k) with bk ∈ [bmin, bmax]
and similarly, Di = D and tij ∈ [tmin, tmax] with tmin > 0. For simplicity, we consider the model without economies
of scale in the limiting case a = 0.
For a given value of the transaction cost pT we will now derive a (very loose) upper bound for the size of a cluster.
Consider the longest shortest path Πki,max in one cluster between agent i and its supplier i∗. The transaction cost
along those paths cannot be higher than the difference between the production costs per unit of the two nodes:
bi∗ + pTTi∗i ≤ bi
⇒ pTTi∗i ≤ bi − bi∗ ≤ bmax − bmin ,
which means that there are at most dmax links involved in the path, where
dmax ≤ Ti
∗i
tmin
≤ bmax − bmin
pT tmin
. (26)
If the underlying network has a maximum degree kmax, we can then find an upper bound for number of nodes in the
largest cluster as
C1(pT ) ≤ 1 + kmax + k2max + · · ·+ kdmaxmax =
dmax∑
d=0
kdmax <∞ (27)
for any pT > 0. Thus for a given range of parameters as assumed above in any network with bounded degrees we find
that in the limit of N →∞ the size of the largest cluster will be finite for any pT > 0. Thus the fraction of nodes in
the largest cluster will follow
C1/N =
{
0 for pT > 0
1 for pT = 0 ,
(28)
describing a trivial transition at pT = 0. More importantly, this even holds in cases where, for example, kmax ∼ ln(N),
such as simple random graphs. Similarly, for a > 0 the infinite demand will (in most cases) cause an infinite hysteresis
loop for the system in the limit N →∞.
While these are interesting results, the more reasonable assumption of fine-graining the system maintains the
balance between economies of scale and transaction cost such that the transitions and all related phenomena can be
observed in a finite, non-trivial parameter interval and results for different system sizes can be compared more easily.
Of course this requires the correct scaling of transaction costs, demand and network structure when increasing the
system size.
This balance holds for example for the spatially embedded planar random network. There, the differences |bi − bj |
scale in the same way as the distances with increasing system size since the function b(x, y) is smooth. This means that
ratios |bi − bj | /tij that define when links become active (see Sec. III above) are bounded from below for neighboring
nodes and the transition to global connectedness will occur for pT > 0. Similarly, keeping the total demand fixed with
increasing network size means that the ratio (now including economies of scale) is bounded from above and the largest
cluster will break down for pT <∞. This ensures that both the initial transition as well as the potential hysteresis loop
can be observed on the same scale. However, for networks without an underlying geometry this can be more difficult
and there is not necessarily a correct scaling for all states of the network, as we discuss below for small world networks.
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With a similar argument as above, we can derive a sufficient condition for a discontinuous transition in any network
topology. As soon as a single purchase reduces the production costs at a node k so much that it becomes the optimal
choice for all nodes to buy from this supplier a discontinuous transition occurs since all nodes will join this supplier
in a large cascade of decisions. This is equivalent to the condition
pk(3D) + pT Tki < pj(2D) + pT Tji (29)
for the cost function pk for all other nodes i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and i 6= j, meaning that node i would prefer to buy
from node k compared to all other nodes j. In the limit of large networks N → ∞ with D = 1/N → 0, we find to
first order in D
pk(0) + 3D
dpk(0)
dSk
+ pTTki < pj(0) + 2D
dpj(0)
dSj
+ pTTji ,
pmax(0) + 3D
dpk(0)
dSk
+ pTTmax < pmin(0) + 2D
dpj(0)
dSj
(30)
by substituting the most extreme values possible (maximum cost and distances on the left side and minimal cost
and distances on the right). We then arrive at a (very loose) upper bound for the economies of scale by setting
dpk(0)/dSk = dpj(0)/dSj = (dp/dS)min,
(dp/dS)min < −
∆p + pTTmax
D
, (31)
where ∆p = pmax(0) − pmin(0) and pT is at most the value of the transaction cost where the first transition takes
place. If the economies of scale are stronger than given in this condition, the first external purchase necessarily
triggers a cascade of decisions and thus leads to a discontinuous decision.
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SMALL WORLD NETWORKS
In the main manuscript we studied our optimization model on an underlying small world network [? ]: Start from
a ring of N nodes where each node is connected to its k/2 nearest neighbors in each direction. Each link in the
network is then rewired with probability qrew, i.e., disconnected on one end and connected to another node in the
network chosen uniformly at random.
In the main manuscript we showed for systems of size N = 104 how the topology changes the abruptness of the
transition and the number of large clusters emerging. For completeness, Fig. S5 shows the (inverse) size of the
largest gap for different strengths of the economies of scale a for the same system parameters (N = 104, te = 1/N ,
Di = 1/N , bi uniformly random in [0, 1]). A network with large diameter (qrew → 0) allows different clusters to
emerge in remote parts of the network since the distances are large. Hence the jumps of the size of the largest cluster,
denoted by ∆C1, are typically smaller (1 − 〈max∆C1/N〉 is large). However, very strong economies of scale (a > 1)
can compensate for the large distances. Small fluctuations are amplified and one cluster will grow in a single cascade
even in the network with large diameter. In contrast, for small diameters (qrew = 0.01) the jump ∆C1 grows already
for moderate values of a.
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Figure S5. Strong economies of scale lead to large cascades, independent of network topology. The inverse size of the largest
gap in the size of the largest cluster (1 - largest gap) depending on the economies of scale a. For very weak economies of scale
the cascades are small (the inverse is large), independent of the network topology a single agent does not have a large enough
effect on the production costs. As the economies of scale become stronger, the average size of the largest cascade increases
quickly in small world networks; due to the shortcuts a large cluster can affect all parts of the network. For regular networks
with a large diameter (qrew → 0) cascades stay small as transaction costs are still comparatively large. Unsurprisingly, for very
strong economies of scale a single agent will change the production cost enough that the largest cluster grows discontinuously
in a single cascade, even if the distances in the network are large.
Additionally, we want to highlight some difficulties with this network structure in our model. As discussed above, to
avoid trivial behavior in the limit N →∞, we need to scale all parameters, such that an increased system size corre-
sponds to a fine graining of the system. However, in this case choosing a scaling of all variables to effectively fine-grain
the system with increasing system size is not possible across different rewiring probabilities: the required scal-
ing for a regular network with diameter d ∼ N will not be appropriate for a random network with diameter d ∼ log(N).
Similarly, the scaling of k and the choice of the bi over different system sizes is not uniquely defined. The behavior
of the model in the limit of large systems N →∞ thus depends on the choice of the other parameters of the system.
For example, if we choose bi uniformly at random without correlations between neighboring nodes and keep the cost
per link constant, the limiting behavior will be a single cascade for very small pT where a microscopic cluster grows
discontinuously to span the whole network (similar to the discussion above).
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ANALYTICALLY SOLVABLE EXAMPLE
In addition to the complete graph discussed in the main manuscript we present another analytically solvable
example. We consider a square lattice with a well defined single source and the same affine linear production costs
per unit as in the main manuscript. The qualitative results are similar to those obtained for the complete graph,
however, the actual evolution is more similar to the results obtained for the spatially embedded planar random network.
We place N = L2 nodes as a square grid in the unit square. We index the nodes as node (x, y) at position
(x/L, y/L), x, y ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}. As in all other cases we have a homogeneous demand distribution D(x,y) = 1/N .
The production cost parameter b(x,y) at each node is given as b(x,y) = 1 for all nodes, except for the node in the
middle of the grid, where b(bL/2c,bL/2c) = 0 (see Fig. S6). Increasing the number of nodes in this system is equivalent
to a fine-graining of the unit square.
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Figure S6. Continuum illustration of the single source square lattice model. We have b(x,y) = 1 for all points except for the
center point in the lattice at (1/2, 1/2). The distance between two points Tx1,y1;x2,y2 is given by the 1-norm, corresponding
to the shortest path in the square lattice. This continuum form of the model can easily be solved analytically while the
corresponding lattice model can be simulated efficiently.
Due to the symmetry and the single source only one cluster will emerge and we can easily calculate its size. For
simplicity we consider the continuous version of the problem illustrated in Fig. S6, i.e., the limit N → ∞. Due to
the symmetry of the problem, all agents at the same distance dist [(x, y); (1/2, 1/2)] = |x− 1/2| + |y − 1/2| to the
central supplier will behave identically. Note that distances are given as the 1-norm due to the underlying square grid
network structure. Thus, we can derive a self-consistency equation, describing the size of the cluster in terms of the
maximum distance d of an agent still willing to buy from the central supplier. For d < 1/2 the shape of a cluster is a
diamond (due to the 1-norm), but for d > 1/2 the corners are cut off, as we only consider points in the unit square.
For given economies of scale a and transaction costs per unit pT we determine d as the value where the cost of internal
production is equal to the cost of buying from the central supplier:
−a (2d2)+ pT d = 1 d ≤ 1/2 (32)
−a
[
2d2 − 4 (d− 1/2)2
]
+ pT d = 1 d > 1/2 , (33)
where the first term describes the economies of scale due to the size of the cluster and the second term is the
transaction cost.
Solving these equations for d and keeping in mind that 0 ≤ d(pT ) ≤ 1 yields
d(pT ) =

pT±
√
p2T−8a
4a for d ≤ 1/2
4a−pT±
√
8a2+8a−8apT+p2T
4a for d > 1/2 .
(34)
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This equation has no, one or two possible solutions for d for each pT , however, each expression is valid only for some
values of d. Therefore, as long as the bifurcation in the d ≤ 1/2 (lower branch) solution happens for d > 1/2, only
one valid solution exists. We calculate the position of the bifurcation as pcrit,1T =
√
8a and the corresponding distance
dcrit,1 = 1/
√
2a. Thus, as long as a < 2 there is only one continuous solution for d < 1/2. We find a similar result
for the solution of the d > 1/2 branch. Together, for a < 2 the two solutions join continuously and describe a single,
continuous solution for d(pT ). As the size of the largest cluster is a continuous function of d, these results apply
equally to C1. Together, we find that the evolution of the largest cluster is continuous for a < 2, the slope of C1
becomes infinite for a = 2 [see Fig. S7(a)-(c)].
For a > 2, however, the first solution for d < 1/2 disappears at pcrit,1T =
√
8a with dcrit,1 = 1/
√
2a < 1/2. There
is no solution for smaller values of pT < p
crit,1
T and two valid solutions for larger values. Similarly, the solution for
the d > 1/2 branch does not exist for pT > p
crit,2
T = 4a −
√
8a(a− 1) with dcrit,2 > 1/2, but has two valid solutions
for smaller values of pT . The two solutions are still joined continuously, but now by an unstable branch: a slightly
smaller cluster will rapidly shrink to a small stable size, while a slightly larger cluster will grow to the larger stable
size. The transition for decreasing/increasing transaction costs becomes discontinuous and a hysteresis loop emerges
in between [see Fig. S7(d)].
We illustrate these analytical results in Fig. S7 together with simulations for N = 25600 for different values of
a, showing good agreement with our analytical calculations. Contrary to the complete graph example in the main
manuscript, the cluster grows by a finite amount already before the discontinuous transition takes place (similarly
for increasing transaction costs). This is explained by the fact that close to the source in the middle of the grid, the
difference in production cost per unit is constant while the transaction costs disappear for agents that are arbitrarily
close to the center. Since the growth of the cluster is driven by these differences, the cluster grows as soon as pT <∞
whereas distances between two nodes are constant tij = 1 in the complete graph model and thus the cluster can only
grow once pT decreases below a fixed, finite value.
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Figure S7. Simulation of the single source square lattice model for L = 160 (N = 25600) and different a. (a),(b) The transition
is continuous for small a, becoming steeper as a increases. (c) At a = 2 the slope becomes infinite. (d) For larger a the
transition becomes discontinuous with a hysteresis loop. In the continuum self-consistency equation this structure emerges
from a bifurcation of the possible solutions (dashed green lines) with an unstable branch in the middle (dotted line).
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WORLD TRANSPORT NETWORK
In the following we describe the data used to create the world transport network. The nodes of the network describe
individual countries or smaller regions of large countries (China, Russia, USA, Canada). The location of each node
is given as the centroid of the respective country or the largest city in the corresponding region. For each of these
countries we collected the total gross domestic product (GDP) and the total population as additional parameters.
Further, we assign a harbor to each country with access to the sea, using the largest harbor in the country/region. The
full world map with the location of all nodes is shown in Fig. S8. See the Supplementary Data for all data and sources.
Transport links exist via land between countries sharing a border. The transaction cost of these links is simply given
as the geodesic distance between the connected nodes. Transport links via sea exist between all countries/regions
with a harbor. Here, the transaction cost is given as the sum of the distance of the corresponding node to the
respective harbor for both countries and the length of the actual sea route, teij = tharbori + tharborj + TStsea, where
tharbori is the distance of the node corresponding to country i to its largest harbor. These sea routes were determined
as shortest paths across a triangulation of the worlds oceans, explicitly including important routes and channels (for
example the Panama and Suez channel). In order to change the preferred mode of transport we introduce the factor
TS describing the relative cost of sea travel compared to land travel. To determine the transaction cost for sea links
we scale the length of the sea route with this factor, such that TS < 1 effectively means that sea travel is preferred,
while for TS > 1 land travel is comparatively cheaper.
To determine the parameters for our model we used the population and GDP of each country: bi = b = const.,
a = 1 and Di ∼ 1.15Pi +Gi, where Pi and Gi are the population and GDP of the corresponding region relative to the
world total. The demand is then scaled such that, as in the other examples, the total demand is
∑
iDi = 1. Even
though the demand is not identical for all nodes, we use the local percolation algorithm to solve the optimization
problem. As discussed above, this means the algorithm does not necessarily make an optimal update each step and
the solution using the exact algorithm may be different. For comparison, we show the exact solution (algorithm 1) in
Fig. S9. The qualitative and quantitative behavior is almost identical to the results shown in the main manuscript,
differences to the exact solution are negligible.
Figure S8. Location of all nodes for the world transport network. Possible transport links (not shown) exist between countries
sharing a border (via land) and between all countries with access to a harbor (via sea).
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Note, that this similarity is not a-priori obvious. Especially, differences will be larger in networks with a more
heterogeneous demand distribution. Additionally, the structure of the network will affect the results: in this case,
the differences are smaller when transport via sea is cheap. The shortest paths are the direct connections between
nodes via sea such that the local percolation algorithm checks almost all nodes regardless. Results are more likely to
differ for very sparse networks with a large diameter.
We also illustrate here the impact of large changes in the transaction costs. In the main manuscript and all previous
discussions we assumed a slow, gradual decrease/increase of the transaction costs, but the algorithms also allow to
simulate arbitrary changes. In Fig. S10 we compare an instant decrease from very large transaction costs to a given
value with the results obtained for a gradual decrease. Different suppliers emerge in both cases. More importantly, in
the case of instantaneous reduction of transaction cost, the center of the emerging cluster changes, depending on the
final value of the transaction costs, in a different way compared to the results for the gradual decrease. This further
illustrates the impact of history on the evolution of the model.
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Figure S9. Exact solution of the optimization model in a global transportation network. (a) Evolution of the connected
components of individual suppliers for large sea travel costs (TS = 5). (b)-(d) Evolution of the individual clusters for different
values of the transaction cost parameter pT , land routes are preferred to transaction via sea. (e) Evolution of the connected
components of individual suppliers for small sea travel costs (TS = 0.2). (f),(g) State of the network immediately before and
after the cascade. The results are almost identical to those obtained with the local percolation algorithm (see main manuscript).
The only difference is a small shift of pT for some of the transitions.
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Figure S10. Comparison of instantaneous and gradual decrease of the transaction cost. (a)-(c) Resulting network, when the
transaction cost pT are reduced instantaneously to a given value (parameters are identical to other simulations, large sea travel
costs TS = 5). (d)-(f) Resulting network, when the transaction cost pT are reduced gradually. Depending on the final value of
the transaction cost, different nodes emerge as suppliers of large clusters. Interestingly, if transaction costs are decreased far
enough, the resulting network differs from the one obtained by gradual reduction of pT [panels (d-f)]. If only a few changes
occur in the network [large transaction costs, panels (c) and (f)], there is no difference in the history and the resulting networks
are identical. Otherwise, a gradual reduction leads to different updates before the final value of pT is obtained and consequently
to generally different states. This further illustrates the multitude of stable states for any given value of the transaction costs.
